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Abstract  
 The last decade a general shift has been realized in the water management sector 
in the Netherlands. The shift from a top-down (cooperative monopoloid) to a 
bottom-up institutional setting (cooperative multi-centric) was accompanied by 
various effects on the societal context. The benefits of the institutional shift do not 
only involve the most important actors (e.g. the Ministry of Transport and Water 
Management, the Municipalities) but also allows them to achieve their goals. The 
disadvantages of the institutional shift concern the long duration of the policy 
design process since issues and perceptions are steered in multiple phases and 
negotiated at all levels of institutional structuration. These undesirable effects can 
be considered as the impacts of the institutional transitions and can be alleviated 
by a more thorough design of the policy design process along the administrative 
layers as well as by the sustaining of openness and diversity of actors in the policy 
design process. The fruitful cooperative climate between the involved 
administrative bodies of water management sectors need to be conserved for 
forthcoming water policy challenges.  
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1. Introduction  
Institutional reforms are realized in several European countries so as to respond to demands of 
higher efficiency and effectiveness in serving public interests. The institutional structure shapes 
the conditions under which the policy development will progress as an accommodation space for 
actor interaction and collaboration. The impact of these reforms on the content and the process of 
policy design are unquestionable. However, there is no conceptual ground for public 
administrators to step up when designing institutional transitions so as to foresee the impacts of it 
on the policy design space. Researching the institutional design field and the institutional change 
field, it is observed that there is neither clear linkage between institutional structures and 
institutional settings nor a clear description of the shifts between them in face of a structural 
change. The current study aims at providing an answer to the following research question: Can 
we develop a typology of institutional transitions? The links between structures and settings and a 
typology that captures the institutional shifts is needed so as to provide the theoretical ground for 
further elaboration on the impact of institutional transitions on policy design process.  
Practitioners in the policy design field –in the water management sector in the 
Netherlands- specify the prolonged time and the closedness towards new ideas of policy design 
processes as problematic effects but have no idea on how these are caused. The basic promise of 
this paper apart from the development of the typology of institutional transitions is also the 
unraveling of causal links between the institutional transition and the characteristics of the policy 
design process.  
 
3. Research methodology 
The first step incorporates the delineation between institutional structures and institutional 
settings so as to distinguish the types based on the two operational levels (De Jong, 1999; 
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 Scharpf, 1997). Institutional structures (De Jong, 1999, p.90-99) provide a description of systems 
at a higher level of aggregation such as the state which are placed at the macro level or 
institutional landscape. Institutional settings (Scharpf, 1997, p.46-47) concern the organization of 
administrative bodies at a lower level of aggregation namely the meso level. Institutional settings 
are the emerging systems having institutional structures as substrates (See Appendix, Box 1). 
The second step includes the drawing of links between the structures and institutional 
settings. The links between the different types of institutional structures and the different types of 
institutional settings comprise the integrated conceptual model and show how the institutional 
landscape conditions which types of institutional settings will be constellated. The usability of the 
conceptual model rests on the diagnostic power to explain the forthcoming changes in the level 
that is the buffer of the transition.  
The third step includes the development of the typology of the institutional transitions 
(Jaspers, 2003; Lane, 1997) by showing the impact of decentralization and/or centralization on 
the type of institutional structures.  
The fourth step incorporates the application of the developed typology and the conceptual 
model. It is used as a tool for analysis of the water management sector in the Netherlands. A 
comprehensive and in-depth analysis of the function and structure of the water management 
sector has been performed using literature reviews, in person interviews (20 interviews in total 
with at least three representative interviewees from every actor group) and in-situ observations. 
Different actor groups were identified and tailor-made questionnaires developed per actor group 
so as to gather information and data on the function, organization and problems of the water 
management sector.  
 
4. Results  
The result of the research is not only to place every one of the administrative bodies under the 
typology developed but also to show the shifts within the settings spectrum after the institutional 
change. The transition of institutional structure of the water management sector in the 
Netherlands from monocentric to multicentric cooperative institutional structure posed significant 
impact on the way policy development proceeded. The decentralization took place through 
devolution and de-concentration. The evaluation of the policy design process revealed that the 
institutional transition yielded not only benefits but also problems.  
 
4.1 Typology of institutional transitions  
The institutional structures constitute the institutional landscape and influence the types of 
organizational arrangements of administrative bodies in the form of institutional settings. Since 
institutional settings are the emerging systems that have the institutional structures as substrates, 
the type of institutional structure conditions the types of emerging institutional settings. This is 
presented in Table 1 where every institutional structure is linked with the different potential 
institutional settings. For example, in a multicentric state where the power is diffuse and there is 
no specific centre of controlling power, joint-decision systems and networks can develop where 
interdependencies dominate and unilateral agreements and negotiations are the preferred modes 
of interaction.  
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 Table 1: Institutional structures conditioning the formation of institutional settings.  
Institutional structures  
(Macro Level or Institutional Landscape) 
Institutional settings 
(Meso Level)  
Monopoloid ⇒ Hierarchical organizations 
Multicentric ⇒ Joint-decision systems 
⇒ Networks 
Cooperative ⇒ Hierarchical organizations 
⇒ Associations 
⇒ Regime  
Competitive ⇒ Anarchic fields 
 
Hybrids of institutional structures are also possible to be formed e.g. pure monopoloid 
institutional structures are quite rare but competitive monopoloids are common in Eastern 
Europe. Institutional settings are adjustable and adaptable to the administrative services they need 
to provide to the civil society.  
Institutional transitions refer to irreversible high-impact changes in all levels of 
institutional structuration. Institutional transitions concern not only reforms at the institutional 
landscape but also the consequently changes at the meso level of institutional settings. 
Institutional transitions (reforms) respond to the demand for improvement of the key public sector 
operations: allocation, redistribution and regulation (after Lane, 1997, p.9). Institutional 
transitions can be initiated from both levels: Top-down imposed shifts (starting at institutional 
landscape) are followed by changes in the operation styles at the institutional setting level. Top-
down institutional transitions are more frequently realized and described – addressed as public 
reforms (see Lane, 1997) – since the exercise of (legitimization) power from administrative 
authorities remove implementation barriers of such a transition. Changes in the form of interplay 
between settings and changes of organizational routines that institutional settings need to realize 
ask for an upgrading shift at the higher level of institutional structuration that is the institutional 
structures’ level. Bottom-up institutional transitions may need more time to be realized since 
meso level perturbations need to overcome administrative barriers and institutional sclerosis in 
order to pose a restructuring of the institutional landscape. Institutional transitions can thus be 
realized either at a top-down or at a bottom-up direction. 
There are two types of institutional transitions initiated at the institutional landscape: 
centralization and decentralization (Lane, 1997, p.9, 25-26; Jaspers, 2003). Centralization strives 
for a concentration of administrative power and tasks to a central authority while decentralization 
concerns the distribution of decision power to the lower level of administrative strata via “the 
insertion of market type decision mechanisms into the public sector without resorting to 
privatization proper” (after Lane, 1997, p.9-10). More particularly, there are three potential ways 
to implement decentralization: delegation, devolution and deconcentration. Every transition mode 
poses a different impact on the institutional structure that is consequently followed by a change 
on the institutional settings’ level. 
The modes of decentralization and their impact on institutional structures are presented at 
this point. The present definitions are adopted by Jaspers (2003) and Uijterlinde, Janssen and 
Figuères (2003). When devolution is realized, executive tasks and competencies are assigned to 
other administrative levels. This complete shift of authorities and power characterizes the 
transition from a monopoloid to a multicentric institutional structure where tasks and 
administrative power are concentrated to multiple administrative institutional bodies (Figure 1). 
In the devoluted decentralized society, “the lower administrative level is responsible for decision 
making and resource mobilization” (Jaspers, 2003, p.84). When de-concentration is realized, 
“executive tasks and competencies are assigned to other (regional) offices of the central authority 
or to lower levels within the same administrative structure” (Jaspers, 2003, p.84). The dispersion 
of responsibilities from a central government to regional branch offices conserves the monopoloid 
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 structure since the authority and the responsibility are exercised within the central institution. In 
delegation there are flows of tasks and competencies from the central authority to other public or 
private authoritative bodies irreversibly. When delegation is realized, there is a clear 
transformation from a monopoloid to a balanced1 monopoloid institutional structure with shared 
responsibilities and authority (Uijterlinde, Janssen and Figuères, 2003, p.6). 
  
Figure 1: Centralization and decentralization transition modes 
between monopoloid & multicentric institutional structures.  
 
For example, a decentralization 
change in the form of devolution 
is translated as a shift from the 
monopoloid to the multicentric 
institutional structure (Figure 1). 
That also translates into a change 
at the institutional settings’ level 
from hierarchical organizations 
either to networks or to joint-
decision systems (in consistency 
with Table 1).  
 
 
4.2 Institutional transition and its impact on the flood defence policy regime in the 
Netherlands 
 
4.2.1 Water management sector in the Netherlands in a nutshell  
Let us first present the institutional space of the water management sector in the Netherlands. The 
water management sector in the Netherlands is well organized but fragmented when considering 
the tasks sharing and/or overlapping between the different administrative bodies. The 
administrative bodies and their respective roles, tasks and services of every organization level are 
presented briefly below:  
- National level: The Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management 
(Ministry of V&W) provides the funding for the entire national and regional water related 
infrastructure being responsible for the formulation of the main policy directions about 
water issues, responsible for the main rivers and for the primary dikes. The Directorate 
General for Public Works and Water Management (Rijkswaterstaat or RWS) established 
in 1798 assigned with the main tasks of the supervision of water management and support 
during the implementation phase of policies after the decentralization of 2002. The 
Directorate General for Public Works and Water Management is supported and 
supervised by the Institute for Inland Water Management and Waste Water Treatment (in 
Dutch Rijksinstituut voor Integraal Zoetwaterbeheer en Afvalwaterbehandeling or RIZA) 
that is the advisory body of RWS and conducts research on water management topics. 
The Directorate General for Water established in 2002 assigned with the task of 
formulation the national policy on flood protection and water management (NHV-special 
6, 2004, p.88-89). 
- Provincial level: Provinces are assigned with the task to define and supervise actions 
related to flood protection and water management. They formulate policies themselves 
but they are dependent on the directions drawn by the Ministry of V&W and by its 
approval (NHV-special 3, 1998, p.85). The Provincial boards are the middle 
administration level between the policy makers – the Ministry of V&W – and the policy 
executors that are mainly the water boards.  
                                                 
1 The term “balanced monopoloid” is used since the delegates coming from the lower levels of administration are taken tasks and 
duties within the central administrative body without ‘diluting’ the mono-centric authority of the central authority.  
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 - Regional and Local level: The Municipalities and the Water Boards are assigned with 
the task to actually reinforce the designed policies concerning the water management 
sector and specifically the flood defence policies. The water boards are without doubt the 
competent authorities dealing with flood protection management and maintenance. They 
actually communicate the policies to the local society; they are the communication 
buffers regarding the reflections and the reactions of the society and are responsible for 
the public consultancy in cooperation with the municipalities (NHV-special 6, 2004, p.77 
and 89-90). 
- Interorganizational level: The Interprovincial Platform (where all provinces are 
members), the Association of Municipalities as a board of deputies of all the 
municipalities and the Union of Waterboards are placed in the interorganizational level of 
the water management sector. The main function of the administrative boards found at 
the interorganizational level is the steering of processes and negotiation in a 
interorganizational arena so as to reduce actors and issues in national arenas (since 
provincial, regional and local authorities are represented by deputies of the inter-
organizational boards).  
- Intraorganizational level: During the policy design process of flood defence policy in 
the Netherlands, there have been established a steering committee and an advisory group 
established for each area (upper or upstream and lower or downstream area). Both the 
advisory group and the steering committee were established by the Ministry of V&W 
after the 2001.  
 
4.2.2 Institutional transition in the water management sector in the Netherlands 
Opting for more effective and efficient institutional structures, the Dutch central government 
realized two decentralization changes that concerned the establishment of the Directorate General 
for Water in 2002 by the Ministry of V&W and the redistribution of policy execution and design 
tasks between the provinces and the water boards enhanced with the clustering of water boards. 
 
Decentralization through de-concentration: Before 2002 the Directorate General for 
Public Works and Water Management (Rijkswaterstaat or RWS) was responsible not 
only for the supervision of the water management and the support of policy alternatives 
when implemented but also for the policy design concerning flood protection and water 
management. After 2002, the national policy on flood protection and water management 
is conducted by the newly established Directorate General of Water. The main task of 
RWS now is to reinforce policies and formulate proposals for plans and projects. The 
decentralization of Rijkswaterstaat was realized with the de-concentration of its executive 
tasks to another directorate within the Ministry of V&W.  
 
Decentralization through devolution: The last 30 years there is a change in the size and 
the number as well as in the tasks of the water boards. A milestone event that signaled 
this change is the Water Board Act (1991). According to the Water Board Act, the 
provinces can formulate policies of their own but must adhere to the directives issued by 
the national government. They must ensure that the national and provincial policies are 
implemented by the municipalities and the water boards (after NHV-special 6, 2004, 
p.89; The Water Handbook, 2004, p.10 and 65).  
The growth of the population led to the increase of the delegates and the interested 
participants in local level. Legitimizing the motto “the people pay and have a say” 
(“belang betaling, zeggenschap”), representatives by the house owners and residents as 
well as by polluter groups (e.g. firms) are elected to participate in the local governments 
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 (NHV-special 3, 1998, p.37). The later changes are a clustering in 37 over-sized2 water 
boards in 2004 (down from 129 in 1990 and 66 in 1998 after NHV-special 6, 2004, p.90; 
The Water Handbook, 2004, p.61) that have their own consultancy experts, are able to 
deal with local problems (Website of Union of Water boards) and are responsible for 
flood control, water quantity, water quality and treatment of urban wastewater. The 
decentralization of the tasks transferred to the water boards is also supported by 
legislative action (the Water Board Act).  
This change of the size as well as of the tasks of the water boards is a sign of devolution. 
Water policy design that was conducted by the Provinces mainly is now realized by the 
water boards, since they are capable of designing and executing policy plans due to the 
increased expertise and human capital they have. Since execution tasks and competencies 
were transferred from a higher administrative level (provincial) to a lower level (local) it 
is without doubt a devolutionary decentralization.  
 
The institutional structure of the water management sector in the Netherlands is characterized as 
multicentric cooperative, meaning the interactions between the actors and the negotiating 
agreements are its key elements. The institutional transition led to a re-arrangement of the 
organization and the operation of the administrative bodies (water boards, municipalities and 
provinces) at the institutional setting level. Sustaining a multicentric cooperative institutional 
landscape, the administrative bodies adjusted their functions to accomplish the new roles and new 
tasks. The organizational form of the administrative bodies after the decentralization is in line 
with the institutional settings linked to the multicentric cooperative hybrid as described in the 
conceptual model (Paragraph 4.1, Table 1// See Appendix Table 2 and Figure 2).   
 
4.2.3 What are the impacts of the institutional transition in the water management 
sector in the Netherlands? 
After the institutional transition in the water management sector in the Netherlands, the “sour and 
sweet grapes” harvested focusing on the policy design process are the following:  
- cooperation between the different administrative bodies involved in water policy design 
was stimulated, was continuous and fruitful 
- institutional landscape supported learning within institutions and steering of the idea 
“give space to the river”  
- institutional landscape is capable to accommodate a policy design process and flexible in 
establishing temporary administrative “limps” to deal with new tasks and new demands  
- a consensus institutional structure such as the multicentric cooperative hybrid the water 
sector has, asks for more interaction hence for more time to proceed towards a policy 
design  
- decentralization indirectly prolonged the negotiation time hence the policy design time 
due to the establishment of multiple policy arenas and the sequential negotiations that 
took place in inter-, intra-organizational level as well as local, regional and at the end 
national arena 
- a prolonged policy design process indirectly brought about opposition from citizens at the 
tail end of the process who claimed that “high waters” belong to the past.  
 
On the one hand, the change of the institutional structure of the water management sector 
supported learning within institutions and stimulated the familiarity of a broad public with the 
                                                 
2 The Water Boards are considered as over-sized due to the increased number of personnel (engineers, water specialists, 
administrators, support stuff etc.) that they had as a result of the merging of smaller water boards into centralized ones.  
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 new idea of “giving space back to the river”3. Additionally, the existing institutional settings are 
capable to organize and accommodate the policy design process and the cooperation between 
them is fruitful. This eases the design process and does not cause opposition. In face of new tasks 
and new policy rounds, new administrative bodies are established so as to deal with the new 
policy design rounds (e.g. the Project Organization Room for the Rivers).  
The established institutional landscape and its function extended the design process in 
such a way that actors showed resistance and opposition at the tail end of the process since they 
questioned the demand of high safety standards along the river on the other hand. The momentum 
created by the near-flood in 1993 initiated the process4 but the relatively low risks experienced by 
citizens and managers since then combined with an extensive self-repeated policy design process 
brought them to the state to question the demand of a new policy to be implemented. Apart from 
those impacts, new ideas were screened out of the process since the dominant pre-selected 
guideline of “space to the rivers” was supported by critical actors. 
More specifically, the delay is partly caused by the characteristics of the institutional 
structure. The multicentric cooperative institutional structure demands more information so as to 
warrant effectiveness and robustness of the policy alternatives; whereas the mode of interaction 
between the existing institutional settings observed is negotiation agreements. The consensus 
institutional structure asks for more and more interaction and negotiation between the various 
centers that actually lengthens the process.  
Decentralization prolonged the time of the policy design process even though it was one 
of the promises to improve the effectiveness of institutional operation (De Jong, 1999, p.190-
191). The more supervision and consultation that takes place, the more time is needed in all the 
levels of authorities therefore the more extensive the process becomes in time. The existence of 
different boards in the inter-organizational level (Interprovincial Platform, Association of 
Municipalities and Union of Water Boards) and the negotiations that take place within them, aims 
at creating a consensus build-up from the lower levels of administration to the higher (national) 
level. Even though this consensus build-up aims at shortening the throughput negotiations time, it 
does not always achieve it. This results again in delaying the process.  
 
5. Conclusions and recommendations 
The institutional structure of the water management sector in the Netherlands is characterized as 
multicentric cooperative, meaning that the interactions between the actors and the negotiating 
agreements are its key elements. Having such a decentralized and power-diffuse institutional 
structure actually diminishes opposition from citizens -while conditions but does not settle the 
openness in the process -because the citizens constitute the heart of the structure and they are 
present in every node of its multicentric network. But operating in such power-diffuse structure 
that asks for continuous negotiations requires a great amount of time for a process to be 
completed. This is the dilemma between having a decentralized institutional space where 
                                                 
3 The main idea of “giving space back to the river” concerns the provision of more space to the river banks by ensuring that the 
riparian areas are available to accommodate water in case of high-waters in the river. The riparian areas are used for recreation and/or 
as nature restoration areas when high-waters are not the case. In a country so densely populated like the Netherlands, space is a 
valuable and difficult to capitalize. For example, demolition projects of entire neighborhoods were recommended as alternatives (e.g. 
case of Lent close to Arhnem) so as to give space back to the river.  
4 The Room for the Rivers Policy design round was initiated by the Committee Boertien I advisory round (1992 until the spring of 
1993). After the Committee Boertien delivered its advice to the Ministry of V&W, the high water in the Rhine and Meuse at the end of 
1993 created a sense of urgency for action on flood protection. The Committee Boertien II was established after the high waters of 
1993 (in February 1994) and delivered it advice in 1994 to the Ministry of V&W concerning the river Maas. Research conducted in 
the national research arena concerning the “Landscape planning for the Rhine” (1996) was also an input to this policy design round. 
The first policy design round of the national policy design arena is finalized with the design of The Room for the Rivers in 1996 that is 
one of the fundamental pylons of the national flood defence policy (see also Silva and Kok, 1996). Given the scope of the present 
paper, it is not wise to go through all the policy design rounds from 1993 to 2006 so as to corroborate the statement that it took almost 
13 years for the implementation of the “give space back to the river” idea by the decision on the Room for the Rhine Branches by the 
Ministry of V&W early on 2006. 
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 processes are time-consuming (due to lengthy and complex negotiations/decision making 
processes) but enjoy the support of citizens and having a more centralized institutional space 
where processes are short in time but at the same time are confronted with opposition from 
citizens whose perceptions and interests are overlooked.  
Another concluding remark concerns the institutional fragmentation of the water 
management sector in the Netherlands. The institutional fragmentation is seen as an Achilles heel 
since recommended policy options are not consistently supported by all the administrative bodies. 
Construction projects of spatial planners contradict with flood protection projects employed by 
water managers.  
The extended policy design process apart from tail end opposition from the public 
showed symptoms of a path-dependent pathology: support of a dominant policy idea 
irrespectively of change in conditions on societal context. This rigidity and closedness regarding 
the unquestionable dominance of the initial idea to “give more space to the river” was supported 
by the fact that the same actors were invited over and over again in different policy arenas (RIZA, 
WL|Delft Hydraulics and the Ministry of V&W are the key actors in the majority of the arenas). 
To overcome these problems, it is recommended for public policy designers and process 
facilitators to:  
- Keep up the cooperative atmosphere: Cooperation between the different administrative 
bodies (of the regional, provincial, local and national level) is continuous and fruitful. 
This is a remarkable situation that policy designers should not only conserve but also 
utilize in order to shorten policy design process’ time. 
- Avoid overlapping of issues between the agendas of the different interorganizational 
discussion boards: A careful design of the agendas may save some time and effort of the 
policy designers. Issues that have been resolved in other discussion boards need not to be 
present in successor rounds if the same actors are present. For example, if an issue has 
been discussed in the Union of Water Boards and an agreement has been achieved, in the 
intra-organizational level where delegates of the Union of the Water Boards are present 
avoid re-discussing it;  
- Maintain openness and diversity of ideas by re-dealing the cards of the game: The same 
roles are assigned to the same peoples over and over again regarding the policy advice 
and the research conducted in flood defence management. The existing knowledge and 
expertise of some actors (RIZA, WL|Delft Hydraulics, RWS) can be utilized in a 
different way. For instance, they flood-management ‘gurus’ can be the coordinators of 
research programs that are conducted by other working groups. By this way, new people 
are involved bringing new ideas into the water management society while the ‘gurus’ of 
the field can reassure that fragmentation of the research programs is mitigated and 
synthesis of the research findings is realized.  
Having an insight of the institutional space and the institutional transition as realized in the water 
management sector in the Netherlands, what drives and what constraints institutional transitions 
is a topic for further research. Researching in depth the potential drivers of institutional 
transitions and the interdependencies of institutional transition to a broader societal transition, 
diagnosing and monitoring such changes may be feasible.  
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 Appendix  
 
Box 1: Institutional structures and settings. 
There are four different types of institutional structures dominate according to De Jong (1999, p.90-99): monopoloid, 
multicentric, cooperative and competitive institutional structures. The definitions and the characteristics of these 
structures will be elaborated here.  
Characteristics: 
 
Type of  
institutional 
structure 
Power distribution Interaction & interpretation processes 
Demand on research and 
development 
Monopoloid One or few actors 
dominate  
-Dominant actor gain 
control over processes  
-Predictable patterns of 
interaction and 
interpretation 
Little incentives for search 
of new information 
Multicentric Diffuse power centers 
 
- Processes develop with 
the interplay of all actors 
- Spontaneous, 
unpredictable course of 
interaction and 
interpretation processes  
Considerable built -in 
incentives for an intensive 
search for information 
Cooperative Important actors as 
moving vehicles 
determining the 
development of 
institutions 
- Robust, reliable and 
repeatable processes 
- Rigid types that tend to 
exclude actors external to 
their system 
- Mutual trust among 
actors 
- Interaction is regulated  
 
Competitive All actors may contribute 
to institution development 
- Ephemeral and specific 
institutional structure 
- Processes reluctant to 
change due to continuous 
interplay of actors 
 
 
Each institutional setting shows a preference in specific modes of interaction that are acceptable or fit better to its 
institutional rules and functions. The selection of different modes of interaction also relies on the demand and on the 
institutional capacity for problems solving and conflict resolutions. According to Scharpf (1997, p.46-47) there are four 
types of institutional settings:  
Characteristics: 
 
Institutional setting 
Characteristics of interaction Modes of interaction 
Anarchic fields and minimal 
institutions  
- interaction free from rules unilateral actions and the negotiated 
agreement 
Networks - constellation of dependencies and 
interconnections among actors 
- power neutralized interaction 
unilateral actions and the negotiated 
agreement 
Regime  - purposeful interaction in respect of 
certain interest positions so as to 
pursue substantive goals 
adherence of interests guides 
interaction and interaction modes 
Joint-decision systems - symbiotically interdepended actors 
- potential to be flexible in crisis 
situations 
unanimous agreement 
Associations and representative 
assemblies 
- collective actor groups with strong 
downward accountability 
unilateral actions, the negotiated 
agreement and the majority vote 
Hierarchical organizations - elimination of freedom of choice 
due to exercise of unilateral power  
all modes of interaction possible 
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Figure 2: Institutional structure & settings of the water management sector in the Netherlands. 
 
Table 2: Institutional settings of the water management sector in the Netherlands. 
 Type of institutional setting Due to:  
Ministry of V&W5 Regime - purposefully specified set of actors that have the 
mission to pursue specific substantive goals (safety, 
accessibility and quality of life) and their interactions 
follow a patterned procedure 
-regime’s upheaval depends on the interest of people 
participating to it to upgrade it 
Province 
& 
Municipality 
Networks  - both of these two administrative bodies are dependent 
on the Ministry of V&W to get approvals for their 
projects and plans, showing the interdependencies 
between them 
- these power linkages between them “create highly 
selective opportunity structures within which political 
exchange take place” 
Water Boards Associations - characterized bottom-up structure and function serving 
the interests of the local community 
- the evaluation criteria are in line with the preferences 
and the priorities of local people that the water boards 
are accountable to 
A
dm
in
ist
ra
tiv
e 
bo
dy
 
Union of 
Waterboards 
& Association of 
Municipalities 
&Interprovincial 
Platform 
Joint-decision systems  - striving for a consensus-building of all parties 
involved, these interorganizational bodies are ideal 
joint-decision systems 
 
 
                                                 
5 Directorate General for Water, Directorate General for Public Works and Water Management as well as 
RIZA are also considered as regimes since they are executive and advisory branches of the Ministry of 
V&W therefore they are not presented in the Table.  
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